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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of foreign exchange 
intervention in two small open economies. Specifically, we examine the intervention practices of 
the Bank of Canada (BoC) and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) for a sample of daily data 
spanning the period from 1989 to the end of 1997. Our analysis suggests that both central 
banks intervene in foreign exchange markets in response to excessive exchange rate volatility 
and uncertainty. Volatility is measured using  the implied volatility of foreign currency futures 
options and uncertainty is proxied using the kurtosis of the implied risk-neutral probability 
density functions. The latter are derived using the implied volatility of options on foreign currency 
futures. We also examine whether the introduction of inflation targets affected the success of 
interventions in the foreign exchange market. Unlike other studies in this area we also explicitly 
consider the role of commodity futures prices which turn out to be important in understanding 
the effectiveness of intervention. We find that central bank intervention in the foreign exchange 
market was largely unsuccessful in both countries though volatility and kurtosis were modestly 
affected. 
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1.  Introduction 
  How does the foreign exchange market react to the intervention practices of central 
banks, especially in small open economies such as Canada and Australia? The existing literature 
has tended to focus on the foreign exchange market intervention practices in large currencies 
such as the US dollar, the German mark and the Japanese yen (e.g., see Sarno and Taylor 
(2001), Dominguez (1998) and references therein). 
Why Canada and Australia? Both are archetypical small open economies. Moreover, 
both have introduced inflation targets and have made their central banking operations more 
transparent. Taylor (2000) argues that a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting are two 
elements in the “trinity” that defines a sound monetary policy (the third being the adoption of a 
monetary policy rule). Clearly, a floating exchange rate is incompatible with foreign exchange 
intervention that is intended to achieve a particular exchange rate objective.  
There are other similarities as well. Both countries’ currencies are viewed as being 
sensitive to similar factors such as interest rate and inflation differentials vis-B-vis the US, 
investors’ expectations of domestic policies, and commodity prices. In particular, financial 
markets often portray both of these currencies as being “commodity currencies”
1  
Yet there are also some interesting differences between the two countries. The Bank of 
Canada (BoC) has targeted inflation longer than has the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and, 
until recently perhaps, its commitment to inflation targeting was considered more formal.
2 
                                                                 
1 In Canada, this is implicitly recognized in the (monthly) Bank of Canada equation used to predict the real 
exchange rate since it includes the commodity terms of trade as a determinant. For a recent application of the 
so-called Bank of Canada equation. See Murray (2000). 
2 The Bank of Canada inflation target is a range, currently at between 1 to 3% in the CPI. The RBA’s inflation 
target is an “average” of 2 to 3%. See Siklos (1999) for more details.  
 
2
Moreover, the BoC publishes a separate inflation report while the RBA does not.
3 Also, the 
BoC has, at various times, emphasized the role of a monetary conditions index (MCI)
4 while the 
RBA does not rely on such an indicator (Stevens 1998). Finally, as we shall see, the record of 
interventions by the BoC and the RBA also reveal some interesting differences.  
Previous studies of this question have tended to examine particular events (e.g., the 
Quebec Referendum, the Mexican and Asian financial crises) to determine if central bank 
intervention is successful (Murray, Zelmer and McManus (1997) is an exception). Here we take 
a time series view and ask: what is the impact of intervention in foreign exchange markets and 
has the adoption of inflation targets played a role in the scale and intensity of intervention over 
time? More importantly, we ask whether intervention has an impact not just on exchange rate 
levels and their volatility but, in contrast to the existing literature, on the uncertainty surrounding 
extreme movements in the exchange rate. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly summarize the extant 
literature. Section 3 describes the model to be estimated, while section 4 discusses the data and 
econometric specifications. Volatility is  proxied by the implied volatility of currency futures 
options while uncertainty of extreme outcomes is proxied via the kurtosis of the implied risk-
neutral probability density functions derived from these same implied volatilities. Finally, our 
specifications explicitly capture the effect that commodity prices might have on volatility, 
kurtosis, and intervention. This is a potentially important feature in the context of two currencies 
                                                                 
3 Although the RBA publishes a semi-annual statement on monetary policy that is viewed as being akin to 
an inflation report. Both central banks have also instituted quarterly updates to these statements. 
4 The MCI is a linear combination of exchange rate and interest rate movements. See www.bank-banque-
canada.ca/english/backgrounders/bg-p3.htm and Siklos (2000).  
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often labeled “commodity currencies,” and heretofore unaccounted for in previous empirical 
work. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence.  
We find that the RBA was effective in reducing volatility but that its intervention increased 
market uncertainty. BoC interventions were not found to influence volatility or kurtosis.
5 Finally, 
the period since inflation targets were introduced in both countries produces significantly 
different outcomes for both implied volatility and kurtosis in Canadian but not Australian data. 
Section 6 concludes and draws some policy implications from our work. 
 
2.   Central Bank Intervention in Foreign Exchange Markets and Exchange 
Rate Volatility 
 
  Sarno and Taylor (2001) is the most recent and up to date survey of the literature on 
foreign exchange intervention. Accordingly, we provide a very brief and selective overview of 
the issues most germane to the present study. Overall, the literature finds that sterilization is 
rather ineffective at systematically influencing exchange rate levels.
6 
2.1 Central banks and exchange rates 
 
Central banks may intervene to correct deviations from what the central bank deems to 
be a fundamental equilibrium value for the exchange rate, or to maintain orderly markets by 
eliminating excessive day-to-day volatility.  
                                                                 
5 A referee has pointed out that increased uncertainty as a result of intervention can be taken as a sign that 
it has been effective by introducing two-way risk in the market. While this might be true it was not the stated 
intention of intervention, at least according to central bank policy statements. 
6 Fatum and Hutchison (1999) argue that an event study approach, in contrast to the time series 
methodology employed in the present study, leads to the opposite conclusion, at least based on the US 
experience. Nevertheless, they admit that defining events requires some arbitrary judgements to be made 
(e.g., the length of the event window, the sample period).  
 
4
  Sterilized intervention has no effect on the monetary base. This approach 
permits a central bank to smooth excessive short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate. In 
theory, since sterilized intervention changes the relative supply of assets denominated in various 
currencies, expected rates of return on these assets should also affect the exchange rate.
7 The 
existing literature identifies at least two channels through which central bank intervention in the 
foreign exchange market can influence agents’ behavior. These are: the portfolio channel, and 
the expectations or signaling channel.  
The portfolio channel assumes that investors are risk averse, and that foreign and 
domestic bonds are imperfect substitutes for each other in an agent’s portfolio. Edison (1993) 
describes the portfolio balance model as one in which a typical investor holds three assets in 
their portfolio: domestic currency, and domestic and foreign interest bearing assets
8. Given that 
central bank intervention does not affect the interest rate, intervention operations will indirectly 
affect the rate of return on foreign assets through changes in the exchange rate. The changes in 
the relative asset stocks result in agents' adjusting their expected rates of return and exchange 
rates.  
A second view is the so-called signaling channel. Through the use  of sterilized 
intervention, monetary authorities can convey their policy intentions to the market. This may 
affect the exchange rate either via an expectations or a signaling channel. This channel is 
effective if agents revise their expectations of current or future policy and the resulting exchange 
                                                                 
7 Henceforth, any reference to intervention will refer to sterilized intervention unless otherwise indicated. 
8 In addition, an investor could also hold foreign currency and other assets, but for illustrative purposes, we 
omit these possibilities.  
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rate. Even if agents do not revise their expectations of the exchange rate, the central bank is 
conveying actions that will affect the exchange rate by signaling policy intentions.  
  Edison (1993) points out that monetary authorities often intervene in the foreign 
exchange market unannounced, which is clearly inconsistent with the motivation for the signaling 
channel. Hung (1997) offers a different perspective about how central banks may affect the 
exchange rate. Unannounced intervention is a reasonable strategy if a central bank wishes to 
manipulate the market. By intervening secretly, a central bank can influence chartists, especially 
in periods of thin trading, by influencing their technical analyses. 
2.2 Excess exchange rate volatility and Uncertainty 
Volatility is a prevalent feature of financial data, including exchange rates (see, for 
example, Mills (1999)). den Haan and Spear (1998), for example, relate the volatility clustering 
of real interest rates to economic fundamentals such as recessions. Moreover, the proxy for 
volatility used in this study is linked to current market prices and, hence, to the fundamentals that 
drive these prices. Excessive exchange rate volatility is undesirable as it is believed to interfere 
with the efficiency of the foreign exchange market, the international flow of goods, services, 
investment capital, and ultimately disrupts domestic financial markets and the conduct of 
monetary policy (e.g., Zelmer 1997, C^tJ 1994, and Edison 1993). Other catalysts such as 
the release of new information, and speculative bubbles, may also contribute to exchange rate 
volatility, especially in high frequency data. 
Bonser-Neal (1996) notes that the level of confidence agents hold about their 
expectations is also important. For example, if there is uncertainty surrounding current economic 
conditions, or if the central bank’s policy objectives are neither transparent nor credible, there is  
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reason to expect a greater amount of volatility in the exchange rate. Moreover, the same study 
notes that while erratic movements may be mitigated through the signaling effects of intervention, 
the policy may actually increase volatility since it is essentially a non-transparent form of 
communication (Bordo and Schwartz 1990, and Destler and Henning 1989). 
  A disturbance to foreign exchange markets could also originate from a speculative 
bubble, as when enough agents act in anticipation of substantial or persistent movements in the 
exchange rate resulting in self-fulfilling behavior.
9 Murray, Zelmer, and McManus (1997) argue 
that expectations in a market with rampant speculation can distort trade and investment flows, 
disrupting orderly domestic financial markets thereby leading to greater volatility in exchange 
rates. These conditions make it difficult for a central bank to implement and maintain monetary 
policy. In essence, they provide an argument that by “leaning against the wind” speculative 
bubbles can be avoided (also see Murray, Zelmer and Williamson 1990). In addition, market 
ambiguity, as reflected in excessive exchange rate volatility, may interfere with the transparency 
objective of a central bank.  
  Murray, van Norden, and Vigfusson (1996) examine the Canadian dollar for evidence 
of excessive (i.e., destabilizing) volatility and speculative bubbles. Their work reveals little 
evidence of excessive speculative trading, suggesting that movements have largely been a 
function of the underlying fundamentals of the exchange rate. While they do find some evidence 
of technical trading, traders’ behavior was found to be equilibrating because it prompted 
                                                                 
9 If information disseminated in markets fails to reveal the true state of fundamentals, as in the case of 
herding behavior, this can contribute to affecting the level and volatility of financial asset prices. 
Alternatively, self-fulfilling behavior can arise because of bandwagon effects as when expectations are 
adaptive so that feedback effects operate. A non-technical treatment of these issues can be found in Shiller 
(2000, pp. 60-2 and 151-3).  
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fundamentalists to re-enter the market. The authors found no significant statistical evidence of 
speculative bubbles for Canada. Using intra-day data, Beattie and Fillion  (1999) find that 
unannounced intervention was not effective in reducing the volatility of the Canadian dollar, 
especially over the October 1997-January 1998 period. Australian evidence (Kim, Kortian, 
and Sheen 2000, and Kim and Sheen 2000), using daily data covering the 1983-1997 period 
as well as different econometric techniques, suggests that RBA intervention practices reduced 
exchange rate volatility and that the RBA appeared to be adept at knowing when to intervene 
and when not to. 
While the foregoing discussion suggests that exchange rate intervention is ostensibly 
meant to reduce volatility, this need not always be the case. Hung (1997) reports that the impact 
of intervention in the US is crucially dependent on traders’ strategies, and these can differ as 
between “noise” traders, who follow trends and market sentiment, and the “fundamentalists”, 
who regard economic fundamentals as the principal determinant of exchange rate fluctuations. 
Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) find that the impact of intervention, also in the US case, is 
influenced by the credibility of intervention policies and its influence on market uncertainty. Both 
features are exploited in this paper.  
As noted earlier, the adoption of inflation targets is inconsistent with regular foreign 
exchange market intervention. In addition, by examining kurtosis, derived from implied 
volatilities, we are able to estimate the connection between intervention on extreme outcomes in 





3.  Central Bank Reaction Functions and the Impact of Intervention on Foreign 
Exchange Markets 
 
Edison (1993) specifies the following simple central bank reaction function used in many 
intervention studies. It takes the form: 
It = a0 + a1 (St - St*) + a2 DSt +b’ Xt + et           (1) 
where It is intervention (I>0 for a purchase of US dollars), St is the natural log of the exchange 
rate (domestic currency price of the US dollar), S t* is the natural logarithm of the target 
exchange rate, D is the first difference operator and Xt is a vector of macro-economic variables. 
The coefficient a1 determines whether or not the central bank attempts to target the exchange 
rate
10 (this coefficient is expected to be negative if intervention is stabilizing), and the coefficient 
a2 is an attempt to capture whether or not the authorities “lean against the wind” that would also 
result in a negative coefficient. Most studies find evidence that central banks intervene mainly to 
smooth exchange rate fluctuations and not their levels. For example, the Bundesbank was found 
to demonstrate resistance to depreciations of the mark, and the Bank of Japan tends to resist 
appreciations of the yen (see inter alia, Dominguez 1998, Baillie and Osterberg 1997, and 
references therein). Kim and Sheen (2000) also report similar asymmetric responses by the 
RBA. 
  Phillips and Pippenger (1993) found evidence for the 1975-1986 period that BoC 
intervention significantly affected exchange rates and that it consistently leaned against the wind 
during this time period. Given the publicly stated policy objectives of the two central banks, we 
                                                                 
10 The Bank of Canada has maintained that it does not target the exchange rate (see www.bank-banque-
canada.ca/english/backgrounders/bg-e2.htm). Amano and Wirjanto (1994) also conclude that the Bank of 
Canada does not target the exchange rate. A similar comment applies to the Australian case (e.g., see 




modify the reaction function estimated by Phillips and Pippenger (1993) and first estimate a 
version of (1) of the form: 
t t i i t i i t i t L KURT L S L PURCH e j b k f t b + + + + + + = - - t N X i   i - t ' ) ( IV (L)   ) ( ) ( 1 0 D D D D D D  (2) 
where PURCHt is the value of Bank of Canada (BoC) or Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
interventions proxied by purchases and sales of foreign currency. Since the proxy for 
interventions represents changes in holdings of domestic versus foreign currencies, it is assumed 
that, just as changes in the exchange rate might prompt intervention, changes in market sentiment 
toward the currency, represented by  DIV and  DKURT, are equally good candidates for 
generating intervention. The terms ti(L), ki(L) and fi(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L
i,  
such that L
i X t = X t-i. PURCHt is defined in the same manner as It in equation (1). DSt is the 
logarithmic change in the exchange rate, defined as either the Canadian or Australian dollar 
prices of US dollars. If excessive variability in the exchange rate prompts foreign exchange 
market intervention, that is, the central bank leans against the wind, this variable should enter 
with a negative sign. DKURTt is the change in the kurtosis from the risk-neutral probability 
density functions (PDF) derived from options on foreign currency futures (see below).
11 
Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of the distribution of a series, that is, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
11 The log normal density function is 
 













S q  
 
where S is the spot exchange rate (at time t), m is the logarithm of the futures price (at time t), where the 
futures price is from the contract that corresponds with the maturity date of the options contract, and s is 
the average implied volatility of the two nearest the money calls and two nearest the money puts.  
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likelihood of extreme outcomes.
12 A change in kurtosis reflects changes in market expectations 
of possible future values of the exchange rate. Intuitively, an increase in the kurtosis of a 
distribution reflects greater market uncertainty about extreme outcomes in exchange rate 
movements. There has been little attention given in this literature to the impact of foreign 
exchange market intervention on the higher moments of the exchange rate distribution.
13 It is 
conceivable that a central bank may react to greater worries about extreme outcomes by 
intervening in foreign exchange markets.
14 Of course, if, as in the case of the Bank of Canada, it 
follows a strict intervention rule, to be described below, then DKURT and DIV, in particular, 
should be insignificant. The RBA did not apparently follow an intervention rule during the period 
under study.   
The use of implied volatilities (IV) in options prices is useful as a measure of volatility 
because they are interpreted by many as a forward looking indicator. It is not clear that volatility 
per se would prompt intervention. It is more likely, however, that changes in volatility might 
prompt foreign exchange market intervention. It ought to be emphasized that the derivation of 
these implied volatilities is conditional on a parametric model, namely a version of the Black-
Scholes option-pricing model ( see below), a point that should not be overlooked (see 
                                                                 
12 Kurtosis is the fourth moment or the third partial derivative of the density function q with respect to S, or 
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13 We also considered a measure of skewness but it was dropped from the specification for two reasons. 
First, skewness is not independent of kurtosis. Second, existing empirical evidence suggests that negative 
skewness is far more prevalent, indicating that markets were persistently “bearish”, while one expects 




Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, p. 378).
15 In particular, the implied volatilities are derived 
by using the option price, a risk-free interest rate, and the spot price of the underlying asset, and 
then solving the Black-Scholes-Garman-Kohlhagen options pricing model for the implied 
volatilities consistent with the options price.
16 
Levin, McManus, and Watt (1998), relying on Melick and Thomas’s (1996) 
methodology, use foreign currency futures options to  extract the entire probability density 
function (PDF), which provides an indication of the evolution of market sentiment over future 
values of the underlying asset (also see Martinez 1998). They use the PDFs to examine market 
sentiment towards the Canadian dollar during specific episodes. The authors found evidence 
that when the BoC’s Monetary Policy Report contained information unanticipated by the 
market, the summary statistics of the PDF reflected the surprise.
17 Bonser-Neal and Tanner 
(1996) is another application that uses IV in examining the dollar/DM and dollar/Yen exchange 
rates. The explanatory power of their intervention equations is generally low and (lagged) 
implied volatilities suggest that intervention was more destabilizing than stabilizing. 
The existing literature has tended to measure the effect of intervention on historical 
measures of volatility by resorting to measures such as the standard deviation or GARCH (or 
EGARCH) estimates, typically relying on daily data. Dominguez (1998) estimates  a 
GARCH(1,1) model for $/DM and $/yen interventions and finds the more ambiguous the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Equation (2) presumes that causality runs from DKURT and DIV to intervention. This need not be the 
case, of course, and we deal with the question below although sorting out the simultaneity between It and 
some of the right hand side variable is problematic. 
15  Current research at the Bank of England (e.g., see Clews, Panigirtzoglou, and Proudman (2000) is exploring 
the use of non-parametric techniques for estimating the moments of the distribution of asset prices. 
16 The inverse of the Black-Scholes model refers to the volatility that equates the theoretical pricing model to 
the actual price of the option. The interested reader should consult Hull (1995) pages 271-272. 
17 The summary statistics are the mean, volatility, skewness, and kurtosis of the underlying distribution.  
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foreign exchange intervention signals by a central bank, the greater the impact on exchange rate 
volatility. Baillie and Osterberg (1997) augment a GARCH(1,1) model with probit estimates of 
the determinants of the information set used by market participants and find little support for the 
view that intervention has a consistent effect on exchange rate levels. Nevertheless, the central 
banks of Germany and Japan were found to “lean against the wind”. Kim et al. (2000) also 
estimate a GARCH(1,1) model for Australia and conclude, unlike Baillie and Osterberg (1997), 
that RBA interventions had a stabilizing influence. However, official pronouncements on 
exchange rate interventions had no significant effect. Bonser-Neal (1996) uses an expectational 
measure of volatility to examine the effect of daily intervention practices of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan, on the implied volatility of foreign currency 
options.  
It should be pointed out that there is no universal argument on whether it is preferable to 
estimate conditional volatilities using a GARCH-type framework as opposed to using implied 
volatilities (and its lags as a proxy for the conditional volatility of exchange rates).
18 
Nt is a vector of relevant news dummy variables to be defined more precisely below. 
As noted earlier, X is a vector of macroeconomic and institutional variables. Some have been 
used in earlier studies of the kind conducted here, most have not. They include: measures of the 
influence of changes in stock market prices, an indicator of changes in commodity prices, the 
US-Canadian or US-Australian interest rate spreads, and dummy variables to capture a variety 
of intervention regime that related studies, and the central banks under investigation, have found 
                                                                 
18 See Dominguez (1998) for a more complete discussion. All results reported below were repeated in the 
GARCH and EGARCH frameworks but are not reported to conserve space. Murray, Zelmer and McManus 
(1997) come out strongly in favor of the implied volatilities approach.  
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to be important. Finally, we also add, where appropriate, a dummy variable to identify the 
inflation-targeting regime (IT) in both countries. The dates are from Siklos (1999). 
There is a need to exercise caution in estimating any reaction function. A central bank 
intervenes in response to movements in the exchange rate. If intervention is effective then this 
should result in changes in the exchange rate. This necessitates a concern for possible 
simultaneity. However, Phillips and Pippenger (1993) note that biases only exist when 
intervention is random or white noise, that is, when intervention does not operate consistently 
within a prescribed set of “rules”.
19 Phillips and Pippenger (1993) also note that some of the 
variables that should be included in the first stage of a two-stage LS estimation are not available 
on a daily basis. Below, report results based on the separate estimates of each equation in the 
model since Hausman’s specification test did not reveal any significant simultaneity problems.
20 
Several authors have also noted that the intervention practices of both countries’ central 
banks appear to have gone through phases, usually from light to heavy intervention and vice-
versa (also see in this connection Weymark 1995, 1997). Phillips and Pippenger (1993), 
Murray, Zelmer, and Williamson (1990), and Murray, Zelmer, and McManus (1996) are some 
studies that report empirical evidence of “leaning against the wind” by the BoC, for example, 
prior to April 12, 1995. However, after that date, there is less evidence of success at learning 
against the wind even though intervention at times increased (Beattie and Fillion 1999). Kim et 
al. (2000a) also find that RBA interventions went  through several phases. For example, 
                                                                 
19 Phillips and Pippenger (1993) rely on official dollar holdings not actual intervention data. The former 
series, as they point out, contains an element of noise. 
20 The simultaneity problem is further mitigated by the resort to daily data, which tends to be noisy, and the 




between July 1986 and September 1991, the RBA leaned against the wind. In contrast, the 
period since 1991 has been marked by a complete absence of intervention or interventions 
were more of a technical nature. We also consider the potential impact of various sub-samples 
but also estimate reaction functions for the full sample. 
Given the foregoing discussion, it is natural to estimate the following two additional 
equations to uncover the impact of foreign exchange market intervention on the higher moments 
of exchange rate movements. They are: 
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  In (3), the dependent variable is the logarithmic change in implied volatility (DIVt) while 
in (4) the market's expectation is measured by the logarithmic change in kurtosis (DKURTt). 
The coefficient on the variable PURCHt-1 could be either positive or negative depending upon 
whether central bank intervention raises or lowers volatility or the uncertainty of extreme 
outcomes. A d ecrease in market uncertainty in the presence of effective central bank 
intervention would be reflected by a decrease in kurtosis in (4). 
  The variable HIGHt is a dummy variable capturing large purchases or sales of foreign 
currencies, where large is defined as the upper quartile of purchases or sales. This variable 
captures any effects that may be associated with large-scale interventions. The dummy takes the  
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value of +1 when there are large purchases of foreign currency and -1 when there is a large sale 
of foreign currency.  
  The vector of “fundamentals” (X) consists of five variables. An increase in the spread 
(DSPREADt > 0), a key variable in the so-called Bank of Canada equation (Amano and van 
Norden 1993), might lead to an increase in volatility as investors would, consistent with 
uncovered interest rate parity conditions, bid up the Canadian or Australian dollars, relative to 
the US dollar. However, the sign for the spread, in equation (4), depends on the circumstance 
surrounding the increase in the spread. If an increase in the spread is suggestive of an additional 
risk premium then market uncertainty increases, implying a positive coefficient. However, if the 
spread changes because of a credible monetary policy initiative, kurtosis may decline suggesting 
a negative relationship. 
Equation (3) differs from previous studies in part because of the inclusion of the 
commodity futures prices index produced by the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). To our 
knowledge, this index has not been previously used in the present context and goes directly to 
the issue of whether changes in commodities prices have a significant influence on exchange rate 
levels, volatility, and kurtosis in the two countries considered. The CRB index represents an 
average of futures prices i n 17 important commodities. It has the added appeal that futures 
contracts are forward looking instruments and that the prices of the contracts also reflect 
anticipated inflation. The significance of this variable could reflect the extent to which currency 
traders view these currencies as “commodity currencies”. Figure 1 plots commodity prices and 
the exchange rate for both countries. It is clear that the period under study is characterized by 
persistent rises and falls in commodity prices. Figure 1 also reveals that movement in the  
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exchange rates and commodity prices in both countries do not tend to parallel each other 
consistently. A decline in commodity prices would be expected to result in a depreciation of the 
Canadian and Australian currencies. There are some drawbacks in using the CRB index (Bank 
of Canada 1999, p. 9), at least in the Canadian context, as it excludes forest products and other 
key components of the Bank of Canada’s own index of commodity prices. However, the latter 
is only available at the weekly frequency. Moreover, the CRB is the index actually monitored by 
foreign exchange market participants. 
DCRBt could be positively correlated with implied volatility and kurtosis if an increase in 
commodity prices leads to higher export prices which, in turn, implies an expected appreciation 
of Canadian or Australian dollars. However, if the market is unsure about what it perceives to 
be the correct value of the exchange rate, a DCRBt > 0 could conceivably be negatively related 
to implied volatility or kurtosis.  
The DSTOCKt variable is the first difference of the squared percent change
21 in the 
daily closing value of either the TSE300 index in Canada, or the All Ordinaries Index in 
Australia. The  DSP500t variable is, similarly, the first difference of the squared percentage 
change in the Standard and Poor's 500 index, and is included to capture US financial market 
impact on the currencies of interest. These two variables appear in many similar studies of 
foreign exchange market intervention (e.g., Murray, Zelmer, and McManus 1996), and their 
presence emphasizes the potential impact of large changes over smaller ones in stock prices on 
volatility and kurtosis not captured by the other variables in the equations. Finally, the ITt 
dummy captures the impact of the adoption of inflation targets on the variable of interest.  
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Inflation targeting, if it is consistent with a pure floating exchange rate, should lead to less 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. The impact of such a policy on volatility and 
kurtosis would depend, in large part, on the credibility of the policy and, relatedly, on whether 
markets believe the central bank will cease intervention at all times in the foreign exchange 
market. 
Finally, a dummy variable is added in the Canadian models to reflect the change in the 
intervention program on April 12, 1995. This dummy variable is set to 1 after this date and 0 
otherwise. For Australia, we also added dummy variables to capture the various intervention 
phases described in Rankin (1998).
22 The news vector ( Nt) is described in the following 
section. 
4.  Data and Other Econometric Issues  
  From an operational standpoint, both the BoC and the RBA intervene through foreign 
exchange dealers. The RBA operates on a 24-hour basis through offices in Sydney, London, 
and New York City. It is interesting to note that the two central banks sterilize their operations 
differently. According to Murray et al. (1996), the BoC used to sterilize its transactions by 
shifting government deposits between its reserves  and the direct clearing members of the 
Canadian Payments Association and, more recently, by using settlement balances provided to 
the banking system and taking into account the need to neutralize government flows. Forward 
Rate Agreements and foreign exchange swaps are then used to assist in the process (Ogrodnick 
and DiMello 1998). Conversely, the RBA sterilizes its operations with financial assets, through 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
21 Approximated via the first log difference of the series.  
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the outright sale or purchase of government securities, repurchase agreements, or by using a 
foreign exchange swap. 
  Actual intervention data are confidential in Canada but can be proxied by using the daily 
change in the closing balance of the Exchange Fund Account (EFA; in US funds).
23 Prior to 
1995, the Bank of Canada intervened to influence exchange rate movements outside an 
(unobserved) non-intervention band. Beginning April 12, 1995, the Bank modified its 
intervention practices by reducing their frequency but at the same time increasing their intensity. 
In general, the rules were meant to provide more discretion to the Bank as foreign exchange 
market conditions warranted (see Murray, Zelmer and McManus (1997, pp. 318-320)) while 
providing markets with a better idea of the non-intervention band which was, at the same time, 
widened. In September 1998, the Bank abandoned its mechanistic approach to intervention 
altogether. The BoC data includes the effects of other foreign exchange operations. For 
example, the Bank makes US dollar denominated payments on behalf of the federal government 
from the EFA account and then replenishes the account with these funds at a later date. Phillips 
and Pippenger (1993) provide support for the use of this series as a proxy for actual 
intervention. Daily purchases for Canada are plotted in Figure 2A. The sample considered is 
from January 2, 1989 to December 31, 1997.  
  RBA intervention data are also confidential but, as with the BoC, the RBA maintains an 
account for foreign exchange operations that can be used as a proxy. This series consists of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 They are: July 1986-Sept. 1991 (Period 1: leaning against the wind); Oct. 1991-Nov. 1993 (Period 2: low 
intervention); Dec. 1993-June 1995 (Period 3: no intervention); July 1995-Dec. 1997 (Period 4: frequent 
intervention for technical reasons). 
23 The actual Exchange Fund Account contains US dollar denominated balances in US dollars, other 




daily net purchases of foreign c urrency in the foreign exchange market denominated in 
Australian dollars. Like the BoC, the RBA also acquires or sells foreign exchange for 
government business that results in some measurement error in the series. RBA purchases and 
sales are shown in Figure 2B. The sample considered is also from January 2, 1989 to 
September 2, 1998. It is worth noting that while the RBA does not disclose official intervention 
data they do provide a graph of this activity (not shown).
24 One cannot help but notice some 
differences between BoC and RBA purchases and sales of foreign currency over the sample. In 
the sample considered there were 1554 days when there were no purchases or sales of foreign 
exchange reported by the RBA. By contrast, there were only 81 days when the BoC was 
completely inactive, at least based on the data in Figure 2A. One difficulty then in the Australian 
case is that the preponderance of zeros may render standard estimation techniques inadequate. 
Some authors (e.g., Baillie and Ostenberg (1997), Kim and Sheen (2000)) have estimated 
separate probit models for positive and negative interventions without clearly justifying why 
intervention is necessarily asymmetric. Moreover, none of the authors, to our knowledge, have 
attempted to control for the selectivity bias problem although it is widely recognized to be 
present. It arises because models such as (2) are estimated conditional on intervention having 
already taken place. We use Heckman’s two-stage procedure,
25 as well as estimate (2) for 
Australia using a Tobit censored regression.
26 Exchange rates used for Canada and Australia 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
24 Between December 1993 and June 1995 the RBA did not intervene. After June 1995 the RBA intervened to 
retire swap positions built up in the 1991-93 period. Kim et al. (2000) provide more information about RBA 
activities in foreign exchange markets as well as additional institutional references. 
25 In the first stage a probit model of the likelihood of intervention based on (2) is estimated and the 
residuals – referred to as the inverse of Mill’s ratio – is inserted into the least squares version of (2). Kim 
and Sheen (2000) and Alkeminders and Eijffinger (1996) instead use the friction model approach. 
26 Alkeminders and Eijffinger (1994) also use the Tobit approach.   
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are the daily noon rates for the Canadian dollar price of the US dollar and, to preserve 
synchronicity, the daily New York closing price of the Australian dollar price of the US dollar. 
Kurtosis is derived using the implied volatility from foreign currency futures options 
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Melick and Thomas’s (1997) PDFs are 
derived using a mixture of lognormal distributions (MLN) which enables a consistent 
specification in the day-to-day analysis of market perceptions using the theoretical upper and 
lower bounds of American futures options on foreign currency to approximate the underlying 
distribution. McManus (1999) has found that while kurtosis is model dependent, the mixture of 
lognormals ranked first among the techniques examined (also see Melick 1999). Moreover, 
kurtosis estimates generally exceed 3, reproducing the well-documented fat-tailed 
(leptokurtotic) nature of foreign exchange rate data. We use a composite measure of the implied 
volatility to derive the kurtosis of the underlying distribution as defined by the Black-Scholes-
Garman-Kohlhagen (BSGK) options pricing model.
27 The implied volatility is the mean of the 
two nearest-the-money calls and the two nearest-the-money puts. Figures 3A and 3B plot the 
implied volatilities and kurtosis for Canadian and Australian data, respectively. There are clear 
trends, up or down, at times in the two series for both countries which partly explains the need 
to difference IV and KURT in (2) to (4). Kurtosis has generally been rising in both countries, a 
reflection perhaps of the relatively large swings in exchange rate levels shown in Figure 1. 
                                                                 
27 The BSGK is a European-style option pricing model but has been shown to consistently underestimate 
American-style futures options because the BSGK model does not price the early exercise premium as the 
price of the underlying asset moves further away from the exercise price. The assumption that the 
underlying spot price of the exchange rate follows a lognormal distribution works well for pricing at-the-
money options. Under the assumption of a risk-neutral world, the mean of the distribution is simply the 
logarithm of the futures price that corresponds with the maturity date of the option.  Typically, the futures 
contract expires about two weeks after the futures option so this provides a good proxy for the market's 
expectation of the future exchange rate.   
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Similarly, there are noticeable changes in the implied volatilities with sharp changes around the 
time a significant appreciation or depreciation is evident in exchange rate levels (again, see 
Figure 1). 
Levin, McManus, and Watt (1998) note some limitations in using exchange traded 
futures options as opposed to over-the-counter (OTC) futures options. One is that trading 
volume tends to be erratic and may lead to inconsistent estimates. The problem is addressed by 
using the average implied volatility of four separate option contracts. Another problem involves 
a “time to maturity” effect or maturity dependence. Futures options are characterized by a 
declining volatility as the expiration date approaches.
28  
There is a positive relationship between the futures option price and the volatility of the 
contract, so in essence, daily summary statistics are essentially point estimates because the 
underlying characteristics are inconsistent.
29 Leahy and Thomas (1998) tested various remedies 
for these inherent difficulties and suggest a regression-based correction 
                                                                 
28 As a simple example of maturity dependence, in a simple regression model where the price of a futures 
contract is regressed on the spot price of the underlying asset from the contract's inception to maturity, the 
residuals are characterized by a declining variance. 
29 The authors proposed that large trading houses would surely monitor the prices of exchange traded 
futures options for arbitrage opportunities. To test this hypothesis, the authors compare implied volatilities 
from at-the-money Deutschemark and Yen futures options that trade on the CME with implied volatilities on 
futures options that can be purchased from the OTC market. Daily OTC prices are a constant maturity series 
as they are quoted as a one-month to maturity contract. The authors found very high correlations, where 
significant discrepancies appear to be related to contract switching points. They note that when they 
switched to a new contract the contract closest to maturity that was trading on the CME typically has 120 
days to maturity, as opposed to the constant maturity 30-days on the OTC market. The options in our data 
set have average days to maturity of 78 days for Canada, and 81 days for Australia.  
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approach that can be used in a time series framework.
30 To our knowledge, this maturity 
dependence correction technique has not been used in an applied time series study of the kind 
considered here.  
The interest rate series for Canada is the constant maturity, annualized yield on the 
three-month Canadian Government Treasury Bill rate. For Australia the constant maturity, 
annualized yield on three-month Commonwealth Government Treasury Notes is used. The US 
interest rate is the constant maturity, annualized yield on the three-month US Government 
Treasury Bill rate. The CRB Futures Index are also daily observations.  
  News variables, which do not include known or suspected intervention activities, were 
collected from a variety of sources. First, we compiled news events information from the Wall 
Street Journal Index (WSJ; Dominiquez and Frankel (1993) also rely on WSJ information but 
of a different variety). This source provides an international dimension to the type of news 
announcements that would influence or be influenced by central bank intervention. In the present 
study, relevant news was found under the subject headings of Foreign Exchange, Interest 
Rates, and Monetary Policy. The news variable is further disaggregated into four categories: 
News, Noise, Surprise_M and Surprise_CB. The News variable contains information about 
changes in interest rates and exchange rates. The Noise variable refers to the effect of 
commentary from an official from the Federal Reserve System in the US or an official from a 
central bank in another country. The Surprise_M variable refers to surprise or unexpected 
                                                                 
30 Their most reliable estimates are derived from an equation of the form: 




announcements as interpreted by the WSJ. Surprise_CB refers to surprise unanticipated change 
in policy direction by a central bank.  
In addition to the news from the Wall Street Journal, news events from domestic 
sources in each country were also collected. In the case of Canada, domestic news items were 
compiled from the Financial Post daily publication were collected under the heading “Bank of 
Canada.” News announcements for Australia are from Campbell and Lewis (1998) and fall into 
three categories. They are: news and commentary about monetary policy, statistical releases 
about economic activity, inflation, the balance of payments and financial aggregates. Account 
was taken of the fact that Australian news releases take place a day ahead of trading in North 
American markets. The  signed surprise is the difference between the actual value of a 
particular economic variable (e.g., the current account deficit, retail trade, inflation) and its 
median forecast as a fraction of the mean absolute surprise over an intervention period. It is 
positive if actual values are larger than the forecast and negative otherwise. Other 
announcements, such news releases by the RBA or the publication of the Monetary Policy 





                                                                                                                                                                                                 
where Mt is the measure that suffers from maturity dependence, d1t is the days to expiration when there is no 
contract switch, d2t is the days to expiration when there is a contract switch, and St is a dummy variable that 
equals one when there is a contract switch. The ct variable is then the residual series to be used in time 
series modeling.  
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5.  Empirical Results 
  Estimates for Canada and Australia are presented in Tables 1 through 6. Significance of 
coefficients is provided at the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance.
31 
5.1.  Reaction function estimates 
Canada. Estimates of equation (2) are shown in Table 1. Estimates over the period of 
the old intervention program are via OLS with standard errors corrected using the Newey-West 
correction procedure. It is noteworthy that the explanatory power of the regression is 
considerably higher under the “old” program than under the “new” program. Recall that 
intervention was less frequent under the “new” guidelines introduced in April 1995.
32  
During the old intervention program, there is significant evidence that the BoC "leaned 
against the wind" up to three lags. Beyond three lags resulted in insignificant coefficient 
estimates. The results confirm what the BoC has stated publicly and what Phillips and Pippenger 
(1993) found earlier, using Canadian data. More interesting is the highly significant coefficient on 
the DKURT variable at one lag. The significance of this variable suggests that an increase in 
foreign exchange market “extreme uncertainty” at one lag led to reduced purchases of US 
dollars, although the coefficient is small in relation to the amount of “leaning against the wind”. 
This suggests that an increase in extreme outcomes in exchange rate movements results in 
intervention activity by the Bank of Canada prior to April 1995. Also interesting is the finding 
                                                                 
31 A referee points out that with large samples, in terms of the number of observations, significance at 10% 
levels should be discounted. Perhaps this is true but the span of the data set is also relevant and, arguably, 
may not be considered to be very long. In any event, readers can at least make their own assessment of the 
relative significance of individual coefficient estimates. 
 
32 Hausman’s specification test (results not shown) finds that OLS was appropriate under the circumstances.  
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that surprise announcements by central bankers (CB) or surprises to financial markets (M) 
prompted purchases of US dollars.  
Estimates of reaction functions under the new intervention program (i.e., after April 12, 
1995) yielded largely insignificant results perhaps due to the relatively small number of 
observations (450). There is less leaning against the wind than under the old program and no 
statistical impact from extreme market uncertainty to BoC intervention in foreign exchange 
markets. In addition, news is found to have only a very small impact on BoC interventions. 
Note, however, that the program dummy is highly insignificant over full sample estimates 
which are similar to the estimates over the old program.
33 In particular, recursive estimates of 
the kurtosis coefficient (not shown) reveal that uncertainty over extreme outcomes prompted 
statistically significant purchases of foreign exchange until well into 1995, and again by the 
summer of 1997. Hence, the chosen s ample periods may not reflect exactly BoC 
announcements of intervention practices. 
It is interesting that since the adoption of inflation targets (IT), the BoC has increased 
the purchase of US dollars. However, as the coefficient is quantitatively small and could, given 
the construction of the dependent variable, be due to technical factors, there is little evidence of 
considerably different intervention under inflation targeting. Moreover, much of the increase 
occurs during Crow’s tenure as Governor that is dominated by inflation reduction, as opposed 
to inflation  control targets.
34 Finally, commodity price changes, the interest rate spread and 
                                                                 
33 In all regressions, for both Canada and Australia, the program dummies are intercept dummies. 
Experimentation with slope dummies did not change any of the results. 
34 Canada introduced reduction targets February 24, 1991. In December 1993 these were changed to the 1-3% 
inflation control targets. See Siklos (1999).   
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stock prices, did not significantly influence intervention activity in the full sample. Consequently, 
coefficient estimates for these variables are omitted from Table 1. 
Australia.   Table 2 presents estimates of (2) for Australia. Statistically significant 
sample selectivity bias (l) was found for the 1994-97 sample only when intervention was either 
non-existent or largely due technical reasons. The positive coefficient suggests that one needs to 
adjust the mean degree of intervention upward relative to the case where sample selection bias 
is ignored. Unlike the Canadian case, the various intervention period dummies are, for the most 
part, statistically significant. In particular, the RBA was, on average, selling US dollars from 
October 1991 through June 1995, despite the RBA’s view that it either did not intervene or that 
its intervention was minimal. By contrast, the RBA was, on average, selling $A during the 89-91 
period, as well as after June 1995 (as shown by the statistically significant estimate for the 
constant term in the 94-97 sample). Note that the 1994-97 period also overlaps the policy of 
inflation targeting introduced approximately in January 1993.
35 There is considerable evidence 
of “leaning against the wind” throughout the 1989-97 period although intervention is 
quantitatively larger in the 1989-93 period than in recent years when inflation targets were in 
place.  
DKURT is significant and negative in the full sample. This result is broadly similar to the 
Canadian experience. Similarly, the inflation target dummy is significant over the full sample and 
                                                                 
35 Almeida and Goodhart (1998) point out that it is difficult to date the introduction of inflation targeting in 
Australia because there was no formal announcement of the program. Stevens (1998) reports that then 
Governor, Bernie Fraser, announced the desirability of an average inflation of 2-3% “over a period of years”, 
subsequently changed to “over the course of the cycle”. Successive Ministers in different governments 
came to accept the policy and it was formalized in a joint government-RBA Statement on the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy in 1996. Interestingly, while the target was initially interpreted in terms of an underlying 
measure of inflation, as did the 1996 Statement, the objective was specified in terms of the CPI, a change 
agreed to by both the Treasurer and the RBA.  
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similar in size to the coefficient estimate for Canada. News concerning developments in imports 
and the trade-weighted exchange rate appear to have had a small, but significant influence on 
RBA interventions. For example, a higher than expected forecast for imports prompted the 
selling of US dollars. Finally, as in the Canadian case, commodity price changes, changes in the 
interest rate spread or stock prices were highly insignificant and are excluded from the results 
presented in Table 2. 
5.2  Volatility and Kurtosis 
 
  Canada.  Table 3 sub-divides estimates of equation (3) into two samples, as well for 
the full sample. This split should provide some insights into how the market reacts to the 
variables defined in equations (3) and (4) under regimes of Governors John Crow and Gordon 
Thiessen, respectively. The Crow  era is assumed to last until the end of 1993. The second 
regime begins as of this date to the end of the sample for Gordon Thiessen's era. The 
justification for the split, based on earlier results, is partly to attempt to determine whether or not 
the foreign exchange market may have viewed any intervention activity differently when inflation 
reduction targets were in place (Crow), as opposed to inflation control targets (Thiessen).  
The coefficient estimates on the PURCH and HIGH variables are insignificant across all 
samples. This suggests that central bank intervention was ineffective in reducing implied 
volatility. The interest rate SPREAD between the US and Canada has a significant positive 
effect on the change in implied volatility. In addition, increases in the CRB futures price index 
reduces the implied volatility in the full and Thiessen samples suggesting that expectations of 
positive commodity price inflation reduced the implied volatility of the Canadian dollar.  
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The data suggest, therefore, that there is some validity in the “commodity currency” 
view of the Canadian dollar at least as it affects exchange rate volatility. It is also interesting to 
note that commentary of central bank officials, most notably from Fed and Bank of Canada 
officials, is significant over the Thiessen sample only. Since inflation control targets were in 
place, and inflation was kept within the target band, announcements from central bankers 
influenced the volatility of the exchange rate. Finally, changes in exchange rate volatility are 
transitory as is apparent from the negative coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. There is 
also a statistically significant effect from changes in stock prices on implied volatilities. Finally, 
implied volatilities are significantly higher under the IT regime. This is to be expected as a 
credible objective of monetary policy is expressed in terms of inflation and the exchange rate is 
permitted to float more freely. 
Estimates of (4) for Canada are in Table 5. The foreign exchange operations of the 
BoC, as reflected in the PURCH and HIGH variables, are again insignificant throughout 
suggesting that intervention, even on a large scale did nothing to reduce uncertainty in extreme 
outcomes. The DSPREAD variable is significant in all samples implying that changes in the US-
Canadian interest rate differential had a significant impact in reducing foreign exchange market 
uncertainty during this period and may also be a reflection of BoC policy. An increase in the 
CRB futures price index increases in uncertainty of extreme outcomes in both the full and the 
Thiessen samples, once again providing a link between commodity prices and higher moments in 
exchange rate movements. Surprises to financial markets (M) are also found to reduce 
uncertainty of extreme outcomes in the exchange rate in the full and Crow periods but surprise 
policy announcements by the central banks increased uncertainty. As with implied volatility  
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estimates, lagged  DKURT is negative, an indication that changes in uncertainty of extreme 
outcomes is transitory. It takes about 7 days to reverse a change in uncertainty. Note also that 
the period of inflation reduction targets (the Crow sample) contributes to a modest reduction in 
the kurtosis. 
Australia.  The results for equation (3) are shown in Table 4. The PURCH variable is 
significant in each of the two sub-samples considered. Hence, unlike the Canadian case, RBA 
actions reduced uncertainty associated with extreme outcomes. However, note that large 
interventions by the RBA (HIGH) had the opposite effect of what was intended since these had 
the effect of raising implied volatilities. The DSPREAD variable is negative and significant in both 
samples. It is possible that a rise in the spread signals a rising premium on $A denominated 
financial assets and a consequent rise in volatility. Turning to the effect of news announcements 
we find that publication of the RBA Bulletin (BULL), as well as changes in monetary policy 
(MP) significantly reduced implied volatility. Implied volatility, lagged one period, is negative as 
in the Canadian case. Therefore, an increase in volatility is reversed in about 3 days time. 
Finally, the sample selectivity bias is insignificant throughout as is the inflation targets dummy. 
The latter is in contrast to the positive impact of inflation targets on implied volatility in the 
Canadian data. 
The results for equation (4) are in Table 6. RBA foreign exchange operations (i.e., 
PURCH) increased market uncertainty of extreme outcomes in the full sample but not in the 94-
97 period, which is consistent with the RBA’s own assessment of its intervention practices. 
Note also that large-scale interventions reduced uncertainty in both samples. The same was not 
found for Canada. More interestingly, we find a significant reduction in uncertainty of extreme  
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outcomes as a result of changes in commodity prices, in the full sample only. This is the opposite 
of the results found using Canadian data. Changes in the spread are insignificant as are changes 
in stock prices ( DSTOCK and  DS&P500). As with estimates of the implied volatilities 
equation, the sample selectivity bias correction factor is insignificant in both samples. News has 
no statistically discernible impact on the uncertainty of extreme outcomes. Finally, kurtosis is not 
statistically different during the period of inflation targets. 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The intervention reaction function estimates for Canada confirm some of the findings of 
previous studies, namely that the BoC and the RBA leaned against the wind. Nevertheless, the 
present study adds a few additional elements to the existing literature. For example, we found 
that foreign exchange activities of the BoC had no effect on implied volatility or uncertainty of 
extreme outcomes. In contrast, RBA interventions reduced implied volatilities but had no impact 
on kurtosis. Consequently, intervention is not terribly ineffective at influencing the higher 
moments in the distribution of exchange rates. Commodity price movements were found to 
reduce implied volatility in the Canadian dollar only. Moreover, while changes in commodity 
prices increased kurtosis in the Canadian dollar, the opposite was found in Australian data. 
Inflation targeting introduces some distinctive features in central bank intervention in 
foreign exchange markets. Purchases of US dollars are slightly higher under inflation targeting in 
both countries but the size of the coefficients suggests that this may be for technical reasons. The 
Canadian experience with targeting was consistent with higher implied volatilities and less  
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uncertainty about extreme outcomes, at least during the time when inflation reductions were in 
place. In contrast, there is little discernible impact from targets in the Australian case.  
Hence, inflation targets can potentially affect the higher moment properties of exchange 
rate behavior. The fact that the targeting regime is, institutionally speaking, qualitatively different 
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 Table 1* 
Reaction Function Estimates: Bank of Canada Intervention 
 
t t t t i i t i i t i t L IV L KURT L S L PURCH e j b k f t b + + + + + + = - - N X i ' ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 0 D D D D D D  
 






b0  8.41 (6.67)  -8.71 (6.85)  11.63 (7.20) 
       
t0 (DS)  1043.31 (1343.90)  841.48 (1678.61)  -1548.04 (2392.08) 
t1  -6428.80 (1974.17)
+  -7116.38 (2746.62)
+  -8574.18 (3738.90)* 
t2  -22912.41 (2587.37)
 +  -19558.92 (4224.45)
 +  -16309.01 (3451.47)
 + 
t3  -6934.78 (2130.71)
 +  -4888.28 (3450.62)
 @  -3959.04 (3187.26)
  
       
f 0 (DKURT)  158.01 (160.41)  384.00 (392.24)  131.10 (138.64) 
f 1  -355.47 (284.19)*  -1612.09 (544.83)
+  309.19 (279.69) 
f 2  -220.45 (205.72)  -1119.13 (516.22)
+  118.86 (223.21) 
f 3  -301.35 (117.39)
+  -956.05 (252.64)
+  -4.57 (163.36) 
       
k1 (DIV)  318.36 (299.57)  577.55 (611.28)  246.46 (271.54) 
k2  -721.52 (530.99)
@  -2511.11 (841.22)
+  295.57 (526.51) 
k3  -422.57 (364.92)  -1662.10 (777.01)*  133.88 (352.61) 
k4  -497.12 (210.25)
+  -1296.77 (331.12)
+  -170.03 (233.58) 
       
b31 (SPREAD)    -81.10 (40.27)*   
b32    -44.96 (33.87)
@   
b33    -35.44 (33.63)   
b61 (S&P500)      26681.14 (14371.61)
@ 
b62      79626.87 (11900.29)
+ 
b63      -7373.01 (33628.11) 
       
j1 (NEWS)  0.94 (7.21)  -6.89 (7.56)  13.55 (20.69) 
j2 (NOISE)  -25.48 (23.77)  -40.70 (34.49)  -15.31 (33.69) 
j3 (CB)  27.69 (19.32)
@  52.84 (26.29)*  65.01 (22.91)
+ 
j4 (M)  41.43 (28.52)
@  88.09 (39.36)*  23.87 (44.47) 
j5 (FP)  -8.31 (29.88)  4.13 (17.87)  21.26 (143.80) 
       
b7 (Program)  2.02 (10.04)  n.a.  n.a. 
b8(IT)  18.19 (9.01)*  18.84 (.04)*  n.a 
Summary Statistics       
2 R   0.17  0.24  0.06 
F (sig. level)  20.24 (.00)  18.16 (.00)  2.54 (.00) 
Observations  1726  1176  450 
 
*  Note: News, Noise, CB and M are the Wall Street Journal news dummies, Domestic is the 
Financial Post  news dummy.  Program is a dummy variable active after April 12, 1994. 
Estimates were obtained using Ordinary Least Squares. Newey-West standard errors are in 
parentheses. * signifies statistically significant at the 5% level; + at the 1% level and @ at the 
10% level of significance.   
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 Table 2* 
Reaction Function Estimates: Reserve Bank of Australia Intervention: Equation (2) 
 
t t t i t i i t i i t i t L IV L KURT L S L PURCH e j b k f t b + + + D + D + D + = - - - N X i 1 0 ' ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  
 
Independent Variables  Full Sample 
(1/2/89-12/31/97) 
Sub-Sample 
(1/1/94 – 12/31/97) 
b0  -0.45 (9.90)  10.92 (0.91)
+ 
t0  (DS)  -1480.58 (469.17)
 +  -105.62 (261.54) 
t1  -1467.76 (387.88)
 +  -863.17 (250.36)
+ 
t2  -783.98 (342.37)*  -770.39 (296.85)
+ 
t3  -176.86 (324.55)
   -541.34 (219.77)
 + 
f 0 (DKURT)  -98.53 (41.17)*  -19.95 (25.06) 
f 1  -55.93 (48.59)
   -18.13 (25.73) 
f 2  -8.38 (42.93)  -1.05 (24.17) 
f 3  -39.99 (37.31)  -1.37 (14.73) 
k1 (DIV)  -238.67 (91.93)
+  -25.56 (39.69) 
k2  -161.49 (104.38)*  -22.33 (45.88) 
k3  -49.41 (71.22)  16.92 (42.13) 
k4  -75.03 (63.07)  19.38 (24.69) 
j1 (NEWS)  1.73 (2.61)  n.a. 
j2 (NOISE)  3.14 (6.81)  n.a. 
j3 (CB)  6.28 (6.97)  n.a. 
j4 (M)  6.29 (7.75)  n.a. 
j5 (MP)  n.a.  1.57 (5.10) 
j6  (INFL)  n.a.  -4.00 (4.93) 
j7 (IM)  n.a.  -2.30 (1.52)
@ 
j8 (GDP)  n.a.  -0.29 (6.18) 
j9 (AWOTE)  n.a.  -3.91 (1.42)
+ 
j10 (CAD)  n.a.  -1.05 (1.80) 
j11 (CPI)  n.a.  -0.46 (4.50) 
l (selectivity bias)  --  35.27 (2.91)
+ 
b8(IT)  19.38 (10.01)*  n.a. 
Intervention periods:     
PERIOD1  19.07 (10.18)
@  n.a. 
PERIOD2  -38.21 (5.39)
+  n.a. 
PERIOD3  -20.16 (1.99)
 +  -1.37 (0.58)* 
Summary Statistics     
2 R   0.13  0.32 
F (sig. level)  14.85 (.00)  19.64 (.00) 
Observations  1912  836 
 
* Note: See note to Table 1.  -- means that the variables were insignificant and were omitted from the 
final estimated specification. n.a. means not applicable, and l is the coefficient which corrects for 
selectivity bias. j5 through j11 are based on the signed surprise version of the Australian news variables. 
(MP = monetary policy announcements; INFL = inflation; IM = merchandise imports; CAD = current 
account; CPI = CPI; see Campbell and Lewis (1998) for further details). PERIOD1, 2 and 3 are the 
intervention era dummies defined by the RBA. PERIOD 1: 01.89-09-91; PERIOD2: 10.91-11.93; 




The Effect of BoC Interventions on Implied Volatility: Equation (3) 
 Dependent Variable:  DIVt 
 






a1  -0.003 (.002)
@  -0.003 (.002)  -0.001 (.002) 
       
b1 (PURCH)  2.85E-06 (9.37E-06)  1.30E-05 (1.82E-0.5)  -3.71E-06 (9.52E-06) 
b2 (HIGH)  -0.0121 (.003)  -0.006 (.006)  0.002 (.004) 
b3 (DSPREAD)  0.034 (.014)
+  .022 (.011)*  0.065 (.28)* 
b4 (DCRB)  -0.37 (.21)
@  -0.22 (.29)  -0.54 (0.31)
@ 
b5 (DSTOCK)  33.25 (13.60)
+  -7.484 (26.69)  40.82 (10.87)
+ 
b6 (DS&P500)    -4.802 (9.75)  7.40 (5.91) 
       
d1 (FP)  -0.003 (.01)  -0.001 (.009)  -0.006 (.012) 
d2 (NEWS)  -0.001 (.002)  -0.0005 (.003)  -0.002 (.003) 
d3 (NOISE)  0.011 (.010)  0.012 (.018)  0.014 (.007)* 
d4 (CB)  -0.020 (.016)  -0.001 (.02)  -0.032 (.023)
@ 
d5 (M)  0.0086 (.007)  0.015 (.012)  -0.0003 (.011) 
       
b7 (Program)  -0.002 (.003)  n.a.  n.a. 
b8 (IT)  0.004 (.003)
@  0.006 (.003)
@  n.a. 
g  -0.17 (.03)
+  -0.15 (.06)
+  -0.18 (.02)
+ 
Summary Statistics       
2 R   0.05  0.02  0.08 
F (sig. level)  7.72 (.00)  2.63 (.00)  6.75 (.00) 
Observations  1867  1060  808 
 




The Effect of RBA Interventions on Implied Volatility: Equation (3) 
Dependent Variable:  DIVt 
 
d9 (BLDG)  n.a.  -0.004 (.01) 
d10 (IM)  n.a.  -0.003 (.004) 
d11 (MP)  n.a.  -0.03 (.01)
+ 
d12 (INFL)  n.a.  0.005 (.02) 
d13 (CPI)    0.002 (.004) 
l (selectivity bias)  0.0008 (.003)  0.004 (.009) 
b8(IT)  0.0001 (.002)  n.a. 
g  -0.35 (.04)
+  -0.38 (.07)
+ 
Summary Statistics     
2 R   0.13  0.14 
F (sig. Level)  29.95 (.00)  6.42 (.00) 










* Note: See notes to Tables 1 and 3, and Campbell and Lewis (1998) for news variables. BULL: 
RBA Bulletin releases; TRADE: Retail trade; FAGG: Financial aggregates; FISCAL: Fiscal 
statement; BLDG: Building approvals. 
  Full sample  Sub-Sample 
Independent Variables   (1/2/89-12/31/97)  (1/1/94-12/31/97) 
a1  0.0001 (.001)  0.002 (.002) 
     
b1 (PURCH)  -9.20E-05 (3.72E-05)*  -0.001 (7.53E-05)
@ 
b2 (HIGH)  0.008 (.005)
@  0.015 (.010)
@ 
b3 (DSPREAD)  -0.04 (.021)*  -0.007 (.045) 
b4 (DCRB)  0.11 (.24)  0.50 (.42) 
b5 (DSTOCK)  2.18 (4.53)  -3.64 (4.96) 
b6 (DS&P500)  -0.25 (3.48)  1.91 (3.66) 
     
d1 (BULL)  n.a.  -0.006 (.005)
@ 
d2 (AWOTE)  n.a.  -0.008 (.01) 
d3 (EMPLOY)  n.a.  0.01 (.01) 
d4 (TRADE)  n.a.  0.006 (.012) 
d5(GDP)  n.a.  0.0002 (.01) 
d6 (CAD)  n.a.  -0.014 (.013) 
d7 (FAGG)  n.a.  -0.02 (.02) 





The Effect of BoC Intervention on Uncertainty: Equation (4) 
Dependent Variable:  DKURTt  
 






a¢1  0.003 (.003)  0.003 (.003)  0.002 (.003) 
       
b¢1 (PURCH)  -2.23E-06 (1.49E-06)  -1.68E-05 (2.51E-0.5)  7.93E-06 (1.76E-05) 
b¢2 (HIGH)  .0001 (.005)  0.007 (.008)  -0.003 (.007) 
b¢3 (DSPREAD)  -0.044 (.017)
+  -0.035 (.014)
 *  -0.06 (.04)
@ 
b¢4 (DCRB)  0.67 (.32)*  0.28 (.39)  1.51 (.54)* 
b¢5 (DSTOCK)  -48.42 (19.63)
 +  3.85 (36.90)  -60.43 (15.35)
 + 
b¢6 (DS&P500)  3.57 (7.68)  9.99 (14.87)  -16.99 (10.64)
@ 
       
d1 (FP)  0.010 (.012)  0.004 (.013)  0.02 (.02) 
d2 (NEWS)  0.002 (.003)  0.002 (.004)  0.003 (.003) 
d3 (NOISE)  -0.017 (.014)  -0.012 (.026)  -0.02 (.009)* 
d4 (CB)  0.04 (.03)
@  -0.006 (.03)  0.067 (.05)
@ 
d5 (M)  -0.017 (.011)
@  -0.028 (.014)*  -0.005 (.019) 
       
g   -0.16 (0.04)
+  -0.17 (.05)




7(Program)  0.002 (.004)  n.a.  n.a. 
b
’
8(IT)  -0.004 (.003)  -0.006 (.004)
@  n.a. 
Summary Statistics       
2 R   0.03  0.03  0.04 
F (sig. level)  5.25 (.00)  3.39 (.00)  3.48 (.00) 
Observations  1859  1060  800 
 




The Effect of RBA Intervention on Market Uncertainty: Equation (4) 
Dependent Variable:  DKURTt  
 
  Full Sample  Sub-Sample 
Independent Variables   (1/1/89-12/31/98)  (1/1/94-12/31/97) 
a¢1  0.002 (.002)  -.005 (.004) 
     
b¢1 (PURCH)  8.75E-05 (3.07E-05)
+  0.0002 (.0002) 
b¢2 (HIGH)  -0.017 (.006)
+  -.04 (.02)* 
b¢3 (DSPREAD)  0.006 (.03)  -.05 (.08) 
b¢4 (DCRB)  -0.60 (.35)
@  -1.02 (.70) 
b¢5 (DSTOCK)  -2.75 (5.27)
   4.81 (6.04) 
b¢6 (DS&P500)  5.06 (5.29)  -5.83 (5.94) 
     
d1 (NEWS)  n.a  .001 (.004) 
d2 (NOISE)  n.a.  -0.03 (.02) 
d3 (CB)  n.a.  .02 (.03) 
d4 (M)  n.a.  -.008 (.013) 
d5 (BULL)  n.a.  0.01 (.008) 
d6 (AWOTE)  n.a.  0.01 (.05) 
d7 (EMPLOY)  n.a.  -0.02 (.02) 
d8 (TRADE)  n.a.  0.003 (.01) 
d9(GDP)  n.a.  0.05 (.04) 
d10 (CAD)  n.a.  0.16 (.10) 
d11 (FAGG)  n.a.  0.04 (.03) 
d12 (FISCAL)  n.a.  0.007 (.02) 
d13 (BLDG)  n.a.  0.0002 (.002) 
d14 (IM)  n.a.  0.002 (.002) 
d15 (INFL)  n.a.  0.002 (.04) 
d16 (MP)  n.a.  9.93E-05 (.0002) 
     
b
’
8(IT)  -0.002 (.003)  n.a. 
l (selectivity bias)  -0.001 (.005)  -0.007 (.01) 
g  -0.32 (.05)
+  -0.37 (.06)
+ 
Summary Statistics     
2 R   0.11  .13 
F (sig. Level)  25.28 (.00)  5.46 (.00) 
Observations  1713  695 
 
 
* Note: See notes to Tables 2 and 4. 
 